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Abstract 
This article examines how Žižek’s analysis of “subjective” violence can be used to explore the ways in which 
media coverage of a terrorist attack is contoured and shaped by less noticeable forms of “objective” (symbolic and 
systemic) violence. Drawing upon newspaper coverage of the 2017 London Bridge attack, it is noted how examples 
of “subjective” violence were grounded in the externalization of a clearly identifiable “other”, which symbolically 
framed the terrorists and the attack as tied to and representative of the UK Muslim community. Examples of 
“systematic” violence were most notable in the ideological edifice that underpinned this framing but also in the 
ways in which newspaper reports served to draw upon British values in the aftermath of the attack. This directed 
attention away from the contradictions within the UK, towards narratives that sought to “fix” these contradictions 
through eradicating the problem of “the other” and/or by violently protecting the British values “they” seek to 
undermine. As a consequence, newspaper coverage worked to uphold the illusion that “peace” could be achieved 
by eradicating terrorism through further forms of objective violence, including, internment without trial; the 
“ripping up” of human rights; and, closer surveillance of Muslim communities. Indeed, it was this unacknowledged 
violence that worked to maintain British values in the press’ coverage. 
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Analysing the London Bridge attack: aims, purposes and methodological concerns 
 
In May and June 2017, the United Kingdom (UK) was subject to two terrorist attacks, the 
second of which took place in London on June 3.1 While driving in a rented van, the three 
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attackers: Khuram Shazad Butt; Rachid Redouane; and, Youssef Zaghba, mounted the 
pavement along London Bridge, driving into pedestrians, before exiting the van and proceeding 
to Borough Market, where they stabbed four people.2 Eventually, the attackers were shot dead 
by police. In total eight people were killed and 48 injured. 
While not deferring from the severity of the atrocity, this article will critically examine 
UK (London-based) newspaper coverage of the London Bridge attack.3 Informed by Slavoj 
Žižek’s conceptualization of violence, it highlights how Žižek’s (2010) analysis of “subjective” 
violence can be used to explore the extent to which media coverage of a terrorist attack is 
contoured and shaped by forms of “objective” violence (Žižek 2013). In particular, it is this 
paper’s contention that examples of objective violence were most noticeable in the media’s 
demarcation of certain outsider groups, in this instance, the UK Muslim community. Implicit 
in this process, is the way in which newspaper representations of British values were 
symbolically used in newspaper coverage of the attack and how these representations can be 
examined and challenged in order “to uncover their latent significance” (Taylor 2010, 92). 
Methodologically, this analysis is drawn from an initial sample of 359 newspaper 
articles, which were collected from the following broadsheet: The Daily Telegraph, The Times, 
The Guardian; and, tabloid: Daily Mirror, Daily Mail, Daily Express, The Sun, newspapers. 
Newspapers were collected on the days following the attack (4 June – 6 June 2017) and were 
subject to a qualitative thematic analysis (Neuman 2003). This followed a process of open and 
axial coding (Strauss and Corbin 1990). That is, while the original sample included any 
newspaper article pertaining to the attack (open coding), closer analysis served to reduce this 
sample to 235 newspaper articles. In this second sample, each article was read and relevant 
themes were identified (axial coding) (Van Gorp 2010). Here, the discursive construction of 
the attack, its perpetuators and wider debates regarding: multiculturalism; Islam; immigration; 
political correctness; and British values, were noted. 
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By applying a Žižekian analysis of the media (Taylor 2010; Žižek 1989, 2010), the 
following sections will highlight how media coverage of terrorism can more purposefully be 
used to identify underlying contradictions within the representation of British values. Aside 
from the media’s often dramatic and spectacular focus on subjective violence, soon to be 
discussed, a Žižekian approach “enables media audiences to perceive the ‘contours’ – the 
‘background’ that make subjective violence possible and inevitable” (Howie 2012, 115). This 
will now be considered. 
 
Žižek: subjective and objective violence 
 
In his layered approach to violence, Žižek (2010) distinguishes between two forms: subjective 
and objective. Subjective violence is the act committed by an agent and it is a form of violence 
that is easily attributable to a particular individual or group. According to Žižek (2010), brutal 
and violent “acts” are forms of subjective violence, “which [… are] experienced, observed and 
enacted on individual victims by perpetrators” (Rudge et al. 2012, 34). More importantly, it is 
subjective violence which “serves to deliver us from the responsibility to act” (Žižek 2012, 5), 
by focusing attention on the act of violence and its immediate brutality. 
For Howie (2012, 59), “terrorist violence is clearly subjective violence”. It is often 
committed by an individual or a small group of individuals, it is “dramatic” in its perpetration 
and it is usually committed against members of the public. Accordingly, it is “the overpowering 
horror of violent acts and empathy with the victims [which] inexorably function[s] as a lure 
which prevents us from thinking” (Žižek 2010, 3). Media coverage implicitly supports 
subjective violence by failing to confront the underlying problems that sustain terrorism, instead 
focusing on its brutality (Howie 2012; Taylor 2010). As a result, subjective violence is not 
unique, in the sense that it is unprecedented or without cause but, instead, such violence 
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emerges from and is shaped by the “contours that sustain and organize visible and brutal acts 
of violence” (Howie 2011, 3).  
In elaborating upon these contours, Žižek’s (2010) objective violence refers to two 
interrelated dimensions: symbolic violence and systemic violence. Symbolic violence is the 
violence of language and the “imposition of a certain universe of meaning” (Žižek 2010, 1). 
This highlights the ways in which hegemonic discourses provide particular representations of 
reality. It reflects the inherent exclusions within language, so that while “There are language 
acts that are direct violent outburst such as discrimination and verbal abuse, … there are also 
structural features of language that impose more subtle, objective language violence” (Howie 
2011, 20).4 
Systemic violence is the unending expansion of capitalism and the economic activities 
that maintain neoliberalism. This is violence which is reflected in the increase in inequality 
between rich and poor and in the move from rural traditions to urban industrialism.5 In such 
instances: 
 
The conventional notion of violence [… is] widened to include de facto economic 
coercion. For example, a cleaning worker on minimum wage may not be frog-marched 
out of the house each day to scrub toilets, but basic economic pressure acts as an 
effective force in its own right. (Taylor 2010, 122). 
 
Furthermore, systemic violence can be used to examine the consequences of Western economic 
practices and political systems globally. 
In drawing a link between subjective violence, systemic violence and “The War on 
Terror”, Žižek (2006, 370) explains how the subjective violence of the American soldiers –
pictured torturing Iraqi prisoners in leaked photos from the Abu Grahib prison, Iraq – was the 
 6 
result of the systemic violence which structures and shapes US society. The leaked photos 
served as an exposition of the “obscene underside” of US culture. Žižek’s comments refer 
specifically to the culture of “hazing” at US fraternities, which often reflect explicit sexual 
themes. Notably, the leaked photos portrayed the US Army personnel performing acts of sexual 
violence against the detainees. As a result, while certain forms of violence can remain hidden, 
they can be objectively real, especially in systemic forms. As evident in Žižek’s (2006) 
reference to US society, such systemic forms of violence can also be reflected in the 
perpetuation of national values which are sustained by obscuring their “obscene underside”. 
This will be returned to in the following discussion on British values. 
For now, it is important to emphasize that the significance of Žižek’s (2010) argument, 
is that rather than viewing subjective violence as the destabilising act of an otherwise stable 
peace, Žižek directs us to consider how such “peace” is sustained by forms of objective violence 
(symbolic and systemic). In doing so: 
 
objective violence is misrecognized and normalized; … subjective violence is noisy, 
riotous and a perturbation of the norm. For Žižek, each form of violence is not to be 
viewed as an opposite pole; rather each is implicated and implicit in the activities and 
operations of the other. (Rudge et al. 2012, 34 [italics in original]). 
 
Therefore, without drawing a discussion to the individual motives of the terrorist, it is important 
that one considers “the conditions that make terrorist atrocities seem morally acceptable to 
desperate, radicalised people” (Sharpe and Boucher 2010, 37). Indeed, examples of terrorism, 
such as: 
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9/11 did not happen in an ahistorical vacuum. There were systematic and structural 
forces – a particular brand of US democracy, the fighting of a proxy war against the 
other Cold War superpower, a militarised everyday culture, Reganomics, a particular 
attitude towards the world, and a host of other objectively violent features – that formed 
the background for the subjectivity of US and Soviet led violence in many parts of the 
world. (Howie 2011, 16).  
 
Similarly, in the case of British-Islamic relations, objective violence can be identified in the 
failure to understand how: 
 
British encounter[s] with Islam [... have] a long and extensive history into which is 
inscribed a complex array of sentiments of affinity and respect for Islam and its 
expression in the cultures of particular peoples, coupled with a parallel trajectory of 
virulent enmities and the rhetorics of denigration. (Alam and Husband 2013, 237) 
 
In view of the above, it this article’s contention that while objective forms of violence 
are not spectacular and, as a consequence, do not receive as much attention, the media’s 
preference for news features that focus on terrorism’s “subjective” aspects provides an 
opportunity to examine how objective forms of violence can be made visible. That is: 
 
Rather than violence being something the news media disinterestedly transmits as 
factual images of violent acts from around the world, violence is re-conceptualized by 
Žižek as the innate oppressiveness of the media’s SOP [standard operating procedure] 
– the powerful and harmful constraints it imposes upon language and thought despite 
its purported neutrality. (Taylor 2010, 146). 
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The significance here is that “[media] passivity can also be violent” (Valentic 2008, 2). As a 
result, mediated violence, such as, the 24-hour coverage of terrorist attacks, as well other global 
events including: environmental disasters; humanitarian crises; and, political scandals, are 
imbedded in forms of objective violence (Taylor 2010; Valentic 2008; Žižek 2010). Before 
turning to newspaper coverage of the London Bridge attack, the following section will serve to 
relate Žižek’s subjective and objective violence to media coverage of terrorism. In this 
discussion specific attention will be given to the framing of Islam, the UK Muslim community 
and British values. 
 
Terrorism, violence and the media’s framing of the UK Muslim community and British 
values 
 
While the role of the mass media in acts of terrorism has been widely noted (Clutterbuck 1977) 
– with Howie (2012, 44) asserting that “it is the media itself that drives discussions, explorations 
and public discourses on terrorism” – it is evident that the media and terrorism continue to 
maintain a level of symbiosis (Schlesinger 1991), with media coverage of terrorism increasing 
since 9/11 (Rohner and Frey 2007). Accordingly, Alam and Husband (2013, 246) argue that: 
 
The [UK] government is not without assistance in [… the] process of selling the risk of 
imminent terrorist threat, for there is an incestuous relationship between the media, the 
terrorist and government; all of them have a vested interest in exploiting terrorism 
through the media. 
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Furthermore, whereas the benefits of prolonged and extensive media coverage can help to 
support terrorists who wish to garner global attention, as noted by Derrida, media coverage can 
also serve to aid those who need, require or wish to frame certain groups as “evil” (Borradori 
2003). 
Consequently, in the UK, Alam and Husband (2013, 250) detail how Muslim 
communities have increasingly come under attention within government rhetoric and media 
coverage as culturally “alien” and “as a potential risk to British social order”. As a result, 
Muslim communities are “seen as constituting both a symbolic and a realistic threat to majority 
‘British’ interests” (Alam and Husband 2013, 250). Indeed, this extends the “violence” of 
terrorism beyond the victims to include those communities who are deemed to be responsible 
for such acts. 
When “Targeted as alien and threatening”, Alam and Husband (2013, 249) contend that 
government policies have served to present “British Muslim communities as marginal to the 
mainstream of British life and as a threat to the British way of life”. Such forms of systemic 
violence have been widely noted within the literature (Awan 2010). In 1997, the Runnymede 
Trust identified values and practices that served to frame Muslims along hostile lines. Here, the 
media was derided as encouraging and perpetuating a view of Muslims and Islam as one based 
upon fear (Allen 2011). As a result, there has been “an undeniable escalation of the negative 
othering discourse concerning Muslims from the early 2000s onwards, which many connect to 
the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent violence in various European cities” 
(Eijberst and Ghorashi 2016, 165). 
Additionally, when considered in accordance with Žižek’s analysis of violence, then the 
media’s framing of terrorist attacks and the apparent “threat” of Muslim communities can serve 
to reveal how such exclusion becomes a product of underlying forms of systemic violence 
(Žižek 2010). In fact, this directs attention to how certain values, perpetuated by politicians and 
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the media, are constitutive of systemic violence and, more importantly, work to obscure this 
violence by focusing on the spectacular effects of subjective violence. This can be seen in the 
taken-for-granted, “common sense” projection of British values, which objectively serve to 
maintain the status-quo (Black 2016). Ideologically, these values are inherently alienating, 
particularly when one considers how national values work to delineate between certain 
individuals/groups who are perceived as following or undermining such values (Black 2016). 
Consequently, as an example of objective (systemic) violence, references to British values in 
media coverage can provide an “invisible”, zero-level standard from which the perpetuation of 
subjective violence is measured against. That is, as a reflection of the status-quo, British values 
remain uncontested and, in the media coverage of terrorist attacks, are presented as a bulwark 
against terrorism. This highlights how British values can work as a form of systemic violence 
which both sustains and perpetuates symbolic and subjective forms. 
Given the intersections between terrorism, the media and violence, the following section 
will apply Žižek’s (2010) subjective and objective violence in order to examine the ways in 
which media coverage of a terrorist atrocity works to ideologically locate certain groups, while 
at the same time, promoting certain values through calls for further violence. In particular, the 
following sections will explore how the media can passively serve in the functioning of 
violence, by examining the subjective and objective dimensions of newspaper coverage of the 
London Bridge attack. While attention will be given to examples of subjective violence within 
newspaper reports, selected extracts will also be used to detail how the press’ coverage and, in 
particular, its ability to demarcate and essentialise “the other”, served as a form of symbolic 
violence that, in conjunction with discourses on British values, presented “veiled discussions 
about who, or who not, to include in a society” (Rudge et al. 2012, 36). Specifically, this will 
explore how the perpetuation of British values was predicated on forms of systemic violence. 
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Subjective violence in newspaper coverage: a “terrifying spree of indiscriminate carnage” 
 
With regard to the work of Ellis (2000, 2009), Howie (2012, 26) highlights how the “the most 
common type of witnessed mediated event sees journalists deploy particular reporting strategies 
which are pieced together and displayed in aesthetically clean and spectacular forms that can 
be easily and unproblematically consumed”. However, what became apparent from newspaper 
coverage of the London Bridge attack was that this reporting followed a “carefully cultivated 
sense of shock” (Taylor 2010, 127). 
Notably, the shock of the attack was evidenced in the press’ reference to a number of 
“traumatic images” that emphasized the attack’s subjective dimensions. The Daily Mail drew 
upon witness videos which had filmed the attack (both during and after): 
 
In one Borough Market pub, The Globe, a man soaked in blood patiently waited as 
someone dressed his wounds. Footage of the scene showed a policewoman crawling on 
the floor with drinkers, ordering them all to keep down. Another terrifying video posted 
online showed officers sweeping through a restaurant bar as petrified drinkers dived 
under tables. (June 5, 2017) 
 
The shock of the attack was, according to The Daily Telegraph, “the second time in less than a 
fortnight, [that] the nation has woken to a story of carnage, horror and heroism that has taken 
place overnight” (June 5, 2017). Here, the “terrifying spree of indiscriminate carnage” 
(Littlejohn, Daily Mail, June 5, 2017) was committed by “knife-wielding jihadis … wreaking 
terror in the packed bars and restaurants around Borough Market, slitting throats and shrieking: 
This is for Allah” (Greenhill et al., Daily Mail, June 5, 2017). For Leo, “London was now a war 
zone” (The Sun, June 5, 2017), with “The … police … being … expected to serve as 
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infantrymen in a brutal war being fought in our streets, pubs and restaurants” (Phillips, Daily 
Mirror, June 7, 2017). 
While not deflecting from the severity of the attack, it is clear from the above examples 
that it was the “terrifying” nature of the attack, the carnage it created and the horror that it 
brought to pedestrian streets, which was laid bear in spectacular form in newspaper reports 
(Howie 2012). In doing so, “the grave sense of irreversible loss [… and] the humiliation of 
fear” (Williams, The Guardian, June 5, 2017) which the attack provoked, was closely allied 
with the press’ framing of subjective violence. Indeed, while Taylor (2010, 122) asserts that 
“the invisibility of objective violence makes it media-unfriendly”, it is apparent that such 
violence is rendered insignificant to those reports that seek to emphasize the dramatic nature of 
the attack. 
Here, the spectacle of terrorism is something that goes beyond the act itself, forming a 
central part of how the event is reported, a process that inevitably adds to the attack’s 
“spectacular” effects (Hoskins and O’laughlin 2007). This was efficiently rendered in those 
examples that contrasted the attack with the “buzzing” bars from which “laughter and 
conversation was shattered by a devastating terrorist attack, as brutal as it was quick” (Topping 
et al., The Guardian, June 5, 2017). By focusing on the attack’s subjective brutality, the 
“shattered” “normalcy” of a Saturday night in London could be established. In so doing, 
newspaper reports were able to highlight how news of the attack revealed a break in normality. 
For Cox: 
 
NEWS of this latest barbaric act of senseless violence reached me at the end of a day 
that until then had been both peaceful and beautiful. Camping with the kids. Toasting 
marshmallows. Crawling into bed in our tepee by the river. Simple pleasures but ones 
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that – once again – we are reminded we can never take for granted. (Daily Express, June 
6, 2017) 
 
While the “simple pleasures” and domestic serenity of Cox’s (2017) family camping trip were 
brought to bear amidst news of the attack, for Phillips the atrocity was a direct attack against 
the “spirit” of London: 
 
A spirit seen in its full, raucous, gobby glory in the capital’s pubs on a Saturday night. 
Those few hours of the week when, free from work and responsibilities, life is full of 
laughter and long stories, too much to drink and just enough romance. (Daily Mirror, 
June 5, 2017) 
 
In addition, Whittow stated: 
 
AS I write this, diners enjoying a pizza are laughing all around me. Outside the 
restaurant at a set of traffic lights naughty children are gently winding up their parents. 
A motorist slows to allow a family of foreign tourists to cross the road. Nothing strange 
in all that. A typical Sunday afternoon in our beautiful country. Except that I am just 
400 yards from London Bridge where unimaginable horror erupted just 15 hours earlier. 
Life goes bravely on in our splendid British way. (Daily Express, June 5, 2017 [italics 
added]) 
 
In each of the above examples, newspaper reports rendered a depiction of “British” society that 
was idealistically natural (“spirit”), romantically free (“simple pleasures”) and harmoniously 
ordered (“A typical Sunday afternoon”). In these instances, it was clear that the brutality of the 
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attack was a “perturbation of the ‘normal’, peaceful state of things” (Žižek 2010, 2 see also Cox 
2017). 
Yet, “objective violence is precisely the violence inherent to this ‘normal’ state of 
things” (Žižek 2010, 2); evident in the sense that it is not the act of terrorism which reflected 
the disruption of civil society, but the “manifest[ation] [of] its underlying phantasmic structure” 
(Žižek 2012, 2). To clarify, it was only after the attack that such “fantasies” of a peaceful, non-
violent British society were apparent, fantasies that ultimately served to accentuate the attack’s 
subjective violence. Here, “Žižek’s analysis of fantasy demonstrates how it plays a powerful 
structuring role in our real, pragmatic lives”, so that, in short, “life without fantasies is 
essentially not possible” (Taylor 2010, 152). In the above examples, it was the symbolic 
framing of the terrorist’s subjective act which revealed the underlying fantasy of an illusory 
British society, represented in romanticized accounts of a harmonious London, naturalized in 
“spirit”. In doing so, the explicit nature of the attack and its subversion of the “normal” 
prevented any considered reflection of its causes. Instead, as the following sections will detail, 
possible causes were found elsewhere. 
 
Symbolic violence and “the other”: immigration, Islam and the “enemy within” 
 
Since 9/11, the argument that there is a “crisis of multiculturalism” has served to characterise 
and “justify political initiatives in relation to integration, security and immigration” (Lentin and 
Titley 2011, 2). This follows that multiculturalism and immigration have resulted in a crisis 
within British society and a degradation of British values. In various reports, the London Bridge 
attack echoed these concerns, with Samuel noting that, “Britain is facing something it hasn’t 
seen before: a threat from within” (The Daily Telegraph, June 5, 2017 [italics added]). Such 
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fear of a residing enemy, located within British society, was echoed by Deen, who asked, “How 
do we tackle an enemy that seems to be emerging from thin air?” (Daily Mirror, June 5, 2017). 
Indeed, the sense that the UK had been corroded from the “inside” was reiterated across 
numerous reports of the attack (The Daily Telegraph, 2017), with the cause of the problem 
being aligned with immigration. Littlejohn added that “The politicians have opened the 
floodgates to mass immigration without insisting on integration” (Daily Mail, June 5, 2017). In 
addition, McKinstry stated: 
 
APATHETIC comfort blanket of tears, tweets and tea-lights is central to the politics of 
denial where the public is not meant to question the revolution inflicted by mass 
immigration or challenge the import of an alien, primitive culture into our midst (Daily 
Express, June 3, 2017). 
 
According to Murray, the attack “might help us weigh up the ongoing cultural benefits of large-
scale Islamic immigration versus the downside of dozens of obliterated lives every now and 
then” (The Sun, June 5, 2017). As evidenced by Littlejohn (2017), McKinstry (2017) and 
Murray (2017), while politicians and “intellectual elites are held to disdain the capacities of 
ordinary people, with their experimental imposition of multiculturalism being among their most 
self-serving gestures” (Lentin and Titley 2011, 156), it is evident that these gestures can be 
reworked to provide a cause for popular mobilization against immigration and multiculturalism. 
Furthermore, as noted by Murray (2017), it was the “cultural benefits” of immigration 
that required consideration. In fact, such calls are often grounded in arguments for ethnic 
integration and/or assimilation, a process that can only occur when “the original ethnic 
difference is either wholly effaced or of only minor, optional value” (Valluvan 2017, 4). As a 
result, for Phillips, there was a clear distinction between “Islamists” and those who are “merely 
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cultural Muslims who observe no religious practices” (The Times, June 6, 2017). Here, the 
demarcation of “Islam” as culturally separate and the segmentation of the Muslim community, 
reflected in those who were only “cultural Muslims”, worked to politicize culture through a 
process of identifying and selecting a subject to be “othered” (Black 2016). 
Notably, “As multiculturalism’s impossible subjects”, Lentin and Titley (2011, 19) 
highlight how it is “Muslims” who often “sit at the apex of a triangulated politics, aligned with 
accommodating relativists and assertive liberal-nationalists in a political geometry convinced 
of these axes as fixed relationships and final horizons”. In coverage of the London Bridge 
attack, the political consequence was that the problem of immigration and “the pernicious 
doctrine of ‘multiculturalism’” were subsequently linked with the creation of “vast, 
monocultural Muslim ghettoes in our great cities” (Littlejohn, Daily Mail, June 5, 2017 [italics 
added]). Consequently, while serving “as lightning rods for writers who were set against the 
policy” of multiculturalism (Karim 2008, 76), it was the Muslim community who were viewed 
as responsible for the London Bridge attack. 
 
Symbolic violence and “the other”: segmenting the Muslim community 
 
While not “suggest[ing] that the vast majority of Muslims in Britain support the terrorists”, 
Littlejohn was clear to point out that “it is incontestable that the terrorists are all Muslims who 
quote the Koran to justify their deranged war against those they consider to be filthy infidels 
i.e.: anyone who fails to subscribe to their fundamentalist beliefs” (Daily Mail, June 5, 2017). 
Murray added, “After every such attack, a parade of political leaders say the atrocities have 
‘nothing to do with Islam’. Now, after yet another night of terror, can we finally ask: Who do 
they think they are kidding?” (The Sun, June 5, 2017). Indeed, the conflation of Islam with 
terrorism – a conflation that worked to subsume the actions of the terrorists with the wider 
 17 
Muslim community (Gerhards and Schäfer 2014) – emphasized that while the press was able 
to detail the actions and debate the possible reasons why the terrorists chose to commit such 
atrocities, in many instances, these actions were simply viewed as a problem of “Muslims” in 
general. According to Roycroft-Davis: 
 
Until decent Muslims accept that those who kill supposedly in the name of Allah 
actually live in their apartheid-like communities, pray in their mosques, seek justice in 
their sharia courts and shop in their halal stores – and are therefore little different to the 
rest of them – then it will always be much easier to take the PC [politically correct] way 
out and shift the blame away from where it really lies. (Daily Express, June 6, 2017 
[italics added]) 
 
Despite drawing a distinction between “decent” Muslims and the terrorists, the above comments 
highlight the ways in which “decent” Muslims are viewed as culturally inseparable to the 
terrorists, who live, prey and follow the same cultural practices. Subsequently, as evidenced 
elsewhere (Eijberst and Ghorashi 2016), the paradox facing Muslim communities is that while 
“On the one hand they are called to lessen their religious attachments, on the other hand they 
are mainly approached as Muslims” (Eijberst and Ghorashi 2016, 165), who are subsequently 
levelled with the cultural burden of terrorism. 
As a result, the Daily Mail stated that “Ordinary Muslims must take responsibility for 
the terrorists in their midst and root them out” (June 5, 2017) and while “Urging Britain’s 
mainstream Muslims to play their part in tackling extremism” (Twomey and Pilditch, Daily 
Express, June 5, 2017), Phillips argued that “We must require Muslims to take responsibility 
for the actions of all in their community” (The Times, June 6, 2017). In fact, despite members 
of the Muslim community denouncing the attacks, Littlejohn “would have preferred to see a 
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few prominent Muslim clerics giving press conferences condemning the slaughter committed 
in the name of their faith” (Daily Mail, June 5, 2017). 
Elsewhere, Jones and Clarke (2005, 306) have highlighted that in media portrayals of 
the “war on terror”, the media “all too easily strays into a somewhat delusional, but diametric 
opposition … that of a Manichaean conflict of Good and Evil – an opposition that, in reality, 
does not exist (in the terms in which it is conventionally set)”. Instead, the above examples 
reveal how ethnic inclusion/exclusion followed a process of segmentation within the press’ 
discourse, most notable in the distinction between “good” and “bad” Muslims (Roycroft-Davis 
2017). In fact, other examples highlighted that while “Frightened people turned to social media 
to explain how Muslim taxi drivers especially had come to their aid with free lifts” (Retter, 
Daily Mirror, June 5, 2017), at sites of mourning in London: 
 
Many among the multi-faith crowd held up signs calling for solidarity in the face of 
adversity. One Muslim's message read: “I am London. I am British. I am human.” 
Another stated: “We stand united with you.” Another said: “You are in our hearts and 
prayers. We stand united with you. Terrorists ain’t no Muslims.” And a group held 
posters spelling out: “We Love London.” Pupils in hijabs from Eden Girls’ School in 
Walthamstow, North East London, laid flowers. (Moyes and Philips, The Sun, June 6, 
2017) 
 
In the same way that ethnic-management becomes the responsibility of the individual (Rudge 
et al. 2012), Moyes and Philips’s (2017) example details the extent to which individual Muslims 
were called upon to display their approachability (Rudge et al. 2012; Valluvan 2017), and when 
they did, such examples were viewed as exceptional or even congratulated (Valluvan 2017). 
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In elaborating upon this process, Awan (2010), while drawing upon the work of Said 
(1997), highlights how: 
 
The narrative depiction of Islam through the acts of terrorism, wars, deaths, fatwas, 
jihads or bombings sustains a Western sociological imagination of Islam but at the same 
token, it thrusts the Ummah, or the global Muslim community, into a constant struggle 
to re-represent Islam. (Said 1997, 55 cited in Awan 2010, 535). 
 
The assertion that Islam is left in a constant “struggle” of (re)presentation, is reflected in 
Valluvan’s (2017, 2) contention that “the production of identities of ethnic difference and the 
incorporation into normative Western practices of urban life is better seen as constituting one 
and the same process”. As an example of symbolic violence, this same process can be seen in 
the ambivalent way Muslims are framed within press reports; that is, as being required to show 
allegiance to the nation, while at the same time, being positioned as outside the nation. As noted 
by the Daily Mail, “These terrorists may be on the fringes of mainstream Islam, but they are 
Muslims nonetheless” (June 5, 2017 [italics added]). 
Therefore, while examples of “neo-racism” dictate a move from biological to cultural 
racism (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991), the latter reflecting the ways in which Muslims are 
perceived as culturally external to hegemonic conceptions of British culture, the above 
examples highlight how the segmentation of the Muslim community (“decent Muslims”) 
worked to culturally locate them as “outside”, yet also, “within” the nation. In other words, as 
a group “unnaturally” in our home. The effect of this separation is that it ambivalently worked 
to prescribe the Muslim community with a preconditioned inability to integrate with British 
culture while also being endowed with the responsibility to “fix” Islamic terrorism in order to 
integrate with British culture. For example: 
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On the morning of this attack, the brave former police chief and Muslim lawyer Nazir 
Afzal said there is an “industry” of Muslim groups spreading lies about this country and 
its counter-radicalisation policies. He is right. And it is time that British Muslims sorted 
this out. Because if they do not, the rest of the nation will. (Murray, The Sun, June 5) 
 
The message should be that British Muslims are welcome citizens but on the same basis 
as everyone else: that they subscribe to the binding nature of foundational British laws 
and values. If not, they will be treated as subversives. (Phillips, The Times, June 6, 2017) 
 
Both Murray (2017) and Phillips’s (2017) remarks reveal how representations of “British 
values” were symbolically grounded in the demarcation of a specific group of national traitors 
(“subversives”, i.e. The Muslim community) and in the subtle call for this group to fix their 
problem, or else (“if they do not, the rest of the nation will”). Here, the ambiguity of Murray’s 
(2017) comments reflected how calls for violence – against Muslim communities – could be 
subtly performed. In fact, it was this symbolic violence – the selective and pejorative portrayal 
of the UK’s Muslim community – which was systemically sustained by references to British 
values. This will now be considered. 
 
The framing of systemic violence: The perpetuation of British values in newspaper 
coverage 
 
While remaining aware of the integrative and disintegrative effects of social norms (De Swaan 
1995), the above examples have served to highlight how these attributes can ambiguously locate 
Muslim communities as both “inside” and “outside” the nation. Here, the UK Muslim 
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community was subject to a “familiar double bind” in that “compliant integration into a 
prescribed national ‘way of doing things’ depends on being recognized as integrating, and this 
is a fragile basis on which to ensure equality” (Lentin and Titley 2010, 192). While this serves 
as an example of symbolic violence within the press, such ambiguity can work to maintain a 
level of subversion from which the promise of “inclusion” is buttressed by a dogmatic and 
absolute adherence to a specific set of British values that are conceived and presented as a 
formative part of British society. In fact, when presented as ‘common sense’, such values can 
serve to reveal underlying form of systemic violence by alienating certain groups.  
The significance of this is reflected in Žižek’s (1989) assertion that ideologies work to 
preserve voluntary consent, giving the impression that the subject is acting “non-ideologically” 
(Daly 1999). In part, this works by associating other groups’ values and beliefs as being 
ideologically driven (Žižek and Daly 2004). Indeed, this was reflected in The Times’s assertion 
that “the recent terrorist attacks, although not linked organisationally, are certainly linked 
ideologically. There is a perversion of Islamic thought which regards people at leisure in the 
metropolis as decadent and diabolical” (June 5, 2017). In contrast to British freedoms, it was 
Islamic ideology which “denigrates the freedoms and rights that people enjoy in liberal 
democracies as secondary to the wisdom exhibited in divinity” (The Times, June 5, 2017). 
Furthermore, in accordance with The Times (2017) article, notice how, in the following 
examples, the notion of “freedom” ideologically functioned as an accepted and unquestionable 
trait of British society:  
 
If you are British, you do not plot against Britain. If you want the protections, security, 
services, and yes, freedoms which this country has fought to be able to give its citizens 
over centuries, then you do not respond with violence. (Ibrahim, The Daily Telegraph, 
June 6, 2017) 
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It will also send a clear message to everyone in Britain: That our society prizes freedom 
of speech above everything else, including your religion, your prophets, your holy book 
and your feelings. (O’Neill, The Sun, June 7, 2017) 
 
With regard to the work of Latour (2004), Jones and Clarke (2005, 303) highlight how “the 
primary pitfall of Anglo-American … politics”, suggests that the notion of “freedom is ‘our’ 
own; it belongs to ‘our’ own world and leaves it only in the form in which ‘we’ cast it”.6 What 
we see in the above examples, therefore, is how the value of “freedom” becomes assertively 
conceived as an inherent trait of Western societies and as a non-ideological fact of what is 
“true”, “right” and “sensible” (Žižek 1989). Moreover, it was in adhering to such freedoms that 
the notion of British values could be dogmatically represented as non-contestable. Indeed, 
Conservative MP, Michael Gove, noted that as part of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, 
“Prevent”, “Organisations that were unwilling to promote British values not only had their 
funding stopped, but were not allowed to work with government” (The Daily Telegraph, June 
7, 2017).7 Similar comments were echoed by the British prime minister, Theresa May, who – 
in her widely recited speech, given in the aftermath of the attacks – stated: 
 
Defeating this ideology is one of the great challenges of our time … it will only be 
defeated when we turn people’s minds away from this violence and make them 
understand that our values – pluralistic British values – are superior to anything offered 
by the preachers and supporters of hate (Theresa May cited in Rayner, The Daily 
Telegraph, June 5, 2017 [ellipses in original] see also Moyes and Philips, 2017; Travis, 
2017) 
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As can be seen, such notions of “freedom” were paradoxically grounded in a dogmatic 
following of British values, echoing previous assertions which stated that Muslims “must” 
accommodate with these values. Here, the “ideological processes” underlying British values 
could be “hidden by their very explicitness and natural feel” (Taylor 2010, 12 [italics added]). 
That is, by presenting such values as natural and an accepted part of British society, then their 
elicitation could appear non-ideological and apolitical, a process that served to further cement 
“the terrorists” and their associated Muslim communities as “unnaturally” outside these values.  
Ultimately, by elevating British values beyond the realm of politics, such values could 
be de-politicized (Žižek 1989). This serves to underscore how the representation of British 
values was objectively violent by systemically structuring a perceived status-quo, which had 
subsequently been undermined by the terrorists. More importantly, while this framing rested 
upon presenting British values being as “uncontestable”, in doing so other interests could be 
promoted. This occurred in three ways: first, by identifying how these values were subverted 
by “the other”; second, by critiquing the apparent tolerance of British society; and, third, by 
denouncing human rights in favor of furthering state control. 
 
The framing of systemic violence: “They are seeking very specifically to rupture British 
security as a nation” 
 
As detailed in the above sections, the limits of liberal tolerance were clearly revealed in 
criticisms of Islam where the promotion of liberal values, such as, free speech, become 
arguments for racial bigotry and Muslim hostility. It is through examining these values that 
systemic forms of violence are made visible. This was most notable in newspaper reports that 
pointed out that the terrorists were motivated by a deep hatred for “our” values. The Daily Mail 
referred to “Islamist fanatics filled with hatred and contempt for our democracy and our secular 
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freedoms” (June 5, 2017) and Whittow asserted that they “are determined to destroy everything 
that we cherish” (Daily Express, June 5, 2017). For Phillips, “They hate our drinking, our 
dancing, our swearing and our sex” (Daily Mirror, June 5, 2017), with their “goal … to erode 
and ultimately destroy the political institutions of a free society and replace them with Sharia 
law” (Ali, The Sun, June 6, 2017). According to Ali: 
 
Those who settle in migrant-dominated communities, who choose not to adopt British 
values, must no longer be allowed to go under the radar. This “cocooning” breeds 
hostility to the host culture. Perhaps most controversially, Islamic schools must be shut 
down if they are guilty of indoctrinating extremism. (The Sun, June 6, 2017) 
 
Here, the “enemy within” was rendered through their pervasive rejection of the nation’s values, 
as noted by Conservative MP, Sajid Javid:  
 
We have seen all too often that there are some people in our country who reject our 
shared values. Who are born here, raised here, have the same opportunities and 
advantages enjoyed by the rest of us, yet choose to turn on their fellow citizens in the 
most brutal way imaginable. (The Times, June 5, 2017)8 
 
This rejection of British values was predicated on the terrorists’ aim to destroy British society: 
 
A terrorist is not the same as someone trying to cause physical damage for criminal 
motives. They are seeking very specifically to rupture British security as a nation, 
damage our institutions, and disrupt the quality of British daily life. And here’s the 
point. They do not want to do these things to damage a building or cause injuries in a 
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crowd. They want to do them because these things are British. (Ibrahim, The Daily 
Telegraph, June 6, 2017) 
 
In Ibrahim’s (2017) remarks, it becomes clear that the terrorists’ motivations were fueled by 
their hatred for British society. While this corresponded with the aforementioned notion of a 
normal, peaceful British society, subsequently “damaged” by the terrorist attack, it also 
highlighted the extent to which such “daily life” was prescribed through less visible and more 
systemic forms of violence. Take, for example, Ibrahim’s assertion that: 
 
British subjects who plot to destroy the fabric of British life, aiming to kill as many 
innocent people as possible in random attacks, destroy government buildings, transport 
or businesses, who sow fear into the seams of the daily life, who seek to rupture the day-
to-day workings of the economy or the business of state, or who act to spread disorder 
and fear, should be considered not just terrorists, but traitors. They should be charged 
with treason. Treason, after all, essentially means betraying one's nation. All British 
nationals owe allegiance to the Queen, wherever they are. If you have the privilege to 
have a British passport, you should not be plotting violence against her subjects. (The 
Daily Telegraph, June 6, 2017 see also Littlejohn, 2017) 
 
Notice how, in Ibrahim’s (2017) example, the subjective violence of the terrorist becomes a 
motive for further forms of systemic violence enacted on behalf of the British state and evident 
in the desire to charge the terrorist(s) with treason. In the juxtaposition between the actions of 
the terrorist and accounts of British values, it was the values of the state which were 
presupposed as non-violent and, as a consequence, were able to stand in moral contradistinction 
to the values and actions of the terrorists. 
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Certainly, newspaper coverage can take on greater symbolic significance when the 
values of society are perceived to have been threatened or undermined (Nossel and Berkowitz 
2006). As already evidenced, while the notion of national values is predicated upon the implicit 
assumption that there are certain “values” that certain individuals and/or groups are required to 
learn, in Ibrahim’s (2017) remarks, it was apparent that the subversion of these values could 
serve as a way of maintaining their preservation (Daly 2010). 
 
The framing of systemic violence: The intolerance of British tolerance 
 
In their study of a “multiethnic workplace”, Rudge et al. (2012, 32) detailed how the notion of 
tolerance “work[ed] to counteract obtaining inclusivity or equity”. They identified “that it is the 
tolerator (the person who positions themselves as ‘tolerant’) who retains definitional power of 
what is to be tolerated” (Rudge et al. 2012, 32 [italics in original]). In the case of the London 
Bridge attack, such notions of tolerance, as held by the British state, were widely reported in 
newspaper accounts. According to Samuel: 
 
Britain isn’t perfect, of course, and many Muslims have no doubt come across 
discrimination or ignorance. But this is by and large a tolerant country, and surveys of 
Muslims suggest that the vast majority feel they benefit from its freedoms. Britain is not 
very good at explaining that these freedoms come as a package, along with tolerance, 
democracy and some degree of liberalism. (The Daily Telegraph, June 5, 2017) 
 
However, despite Samuel’s (2017) account of British tolerance, numerous reports 
sought to argue that Britain had become “too tolerant”, with Afzal arguing that “There has been 
far too much tolerance of extremism in this country. And now in lost lives and spilled blood we 
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are counting the cost” (Daily Mail, June 6, 2017). Others referenced May’s speech, highlighting 
the fact that “Mrs May [had] said Britain had been too tolerant of Islamist extremism, allowing 
copycat killers to repeat atrocities in the wake of the Westminster and Manchester attacks” 
(Rayner et al., The Daily Telegraph, June 5, 2017). Citing May’s speech, Blanchard stated, 
“‘While we have made significant progress in recent years, there is far too much tolerance of 
extremism in our country. We need to become far more robust in identifying it and stamping it 
out”’ (Theresa May cited in Blanchard, Daily Mirror, June 5, 2017).9 For The Daily Telegraph, 
May was “right to warn that parts of British society may have become too tolerant of extremist 
views and that swathes of the public sector have not done enough to tackle the lethal threat in 
our midst” (June 5, 2017). 
Consequently, while liberal multiculturalism is predicated upon calls for greater unity 
and British integration; indeed, a tolerance of “the other”, such tolerance was discursively 
grounded in forms of intolerance. That is, while on the one hand critics of British “tolerance” 
were explicit in their assertion that “the British” had been “too tolerant” of terrorists, on the 
other hand, notions of tolerance and plurality were commended as important attributes of 
British values, reflecting a tolerant, liberal and open UK. In the case of the former, it became 
clear that criticisms of tolerance could be used to not only deride terrorism but also serve as a 
segway for criticisms of multiculturalism, immigration and political correctness. 
Here, the Daily Mail used the terrorist attack to level support for the UK Conservative 
government, by asserting that May’s speech, “signalled a final break with the multiculturalism 
approach championed by New Labour, [by] saying it was time to end the segregation in some 
parts of Britain and to have ‘some difficult, and often embarrassing, conversations with 
communities’” (June 5, 2017). In other instances, terrorism could also provide an opportunity 
for wider derisions of “political correctness”, as noted by Roycroft-Davis: 
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Speak your mind on immigration and you’re a racist; criticise scenes of gay men kissing 
on an early evening soap and you’re a homophobe; dare to remind women in burkhas 
that they’ve chosen to live in a Western Christian country and you’ve committed a hate 
crime (Daily Express, June 6, 2017 see also McKinstry 2017; Murray 2017; O’Neill 
2017; The Daily Telegraph 2017b).  
 
It is here that “the idea of tolerance becomes harder to sustain as multiculturalism increasingly 
comes under fire as mere political correctness which is stopping free speech and interfering in 
social relations” (Rudge et al. 2012, 43). Indeed, what is clear from these examples, is that 
“tolerance” becomes the problem, providing the opportunity for assertions of cultural 
accommodation and for tighter controls on immigration. In certain instance, this led to calls for 
a rejection of human rights, in favor of internment without trial and stricter monitoring of 
Muslim communities. 
 
The framing of systemic violence: “ripping up” human rights 
 
In the aftermath of the attack, a number of articles revealed a distinct sense of justification in 
proposing stronger restrictive measures on terrorist suspects. While working to draw attention 
to the Muslim community, Kemp noted, “We must take a harder line against all forms of 
extremism, shutting down mosques, schools and Islamic organisations that incubate hatred, and 
seriously tackling radicalisation in prisons and universities” (Daily Express, June 5, 2017). The 
Daily Express added: 
 
we have now reached a stage where it is reasonable to demand that mosques, schools 
and community leaders actively discourage the kind of separatism that we see in places 
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such as London’s Tower Hamlets where Sharia law is strong. Police may need new 
powers which will inevitably lead to cries of racism. That is unfortunate but, yes, enough 
is enough (June 5, 2017).  
 
For Phillips, “Until and unless Islam is reformed, we need to treat its practices on a scale ranging 
from extreme caution to outlawing some of them altogether” (The Times, June 6, 2017). Such 
calls for stronger action were discussed in relation to interning suspects without trial. McKinstry 
stated “Internment without trial, controversially used in Northern Ireland in early 1970s, has an 
ugly history but it might be a necessary emergency measure” (Daily Express, June 5, 2017) and 
Ford noted: 
 
The most serious acts of terrorism carry a life sentence and judges impose lengthy 
minimum terms, but Mrs May hinted yesterday that she wants those convicted of a range 
of lesser offences to be locked up for longer. To do this she could introduce a system of 
extended sentences that is already used for people convicted of violent and sexual 
crimes which do not carry life sentences but where the court considers there is a 
significant threat to the public. (The Times, June 5, 2017) 
 
While the above examples highlight how counter-terrorism strategies have been critiqued for 
the ways in which they serve to target British Muslims (Webber 2015), they also reveal how 
any restrictive action was not only normal but radically required. 
According to Valentic (2008, 3), “today’s focus on terrorism as a ‘global’ destructing 
force demands thinking about the way in which ideological frameworks are deployed in 
justification of violence”. Indeed, Howie (2012) details how certain commentators of 9/11 
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promoted “metaphorically sanitized” forms of violence in the media. This was reflected in the 
following examples: 
 
We cannot live in a country where attacks happen every few weeks, and an iron fist 
must now be used against the Islamist cancer in our society. (The Daily Telegraph, June 
5, 2017) 
 
There are multiple interpretations of the Koran. It’s not our job to decide which one is 
correct, simply to deal ruthlessly with any manifestation of Islam which wants to bring 
bloody mayhem to our streets. (Littlejohn, Daily Mail, June 5, 2017) 
 
In certain instances, such assertions could become a conduit for fantasizing about the possibility 
of torturing terrorists: 
 
The pub across the road from where I am sitting is called The Hung, Drawn And 
Quartered. I admit wicked thoughts race through my head as I think about the barbarians 
who killed and maimed in Borough Market. Being hung drawn and quartered is nothing 
more than they deserve after throwing men off tall buildings just for being gay, lowering 
people in cages into swimming pools to drown them, cruelly stoning victims to death 
and now causing havoc on our streets. (Whittow, Daily Express, June 5, 2017) 
 
The tit-for-tat response to terrorism highlights how ideological perceptions of peace and 
freedom are grounded in violence towards others (Goudsblom 2001). As evident in Whittow’s 
(2017) example, this can reveal a far more worrying curtailment of British values. 
 31 
Furthermore, following 9/11, Sharpe and Boucher (2010, 6) have highlighted how “The 
Bush administration also demonstrated that the paradoxical flipside of its ideological advocacy 
of democracy against all radical ideas is in fact the suspension of human rights in the practical 
defence of parliamentary liberalism and the world market”. This was echoed in UK newspaper 
reports. According to Kemp, “The threat these enemies pose to the lives of our people morally 
outweighs any risk to their own human rights” (Daily Express, June 5, 2017), with Hope and 
Rayner noting that, “In the past, attempts to impose tougher restrictions on terror suspects have 
been scuppered by the Human Rights Act, which enshrines the European Convention on Human 
Rights into British law” (The Daily Telegraph, June 7, 2017). Such calls were supported by 
May’s speech, whereby, if elected, May “promised she would not let human rights laws stand 
in her way” (Hope and Rayner, The Daily Telegraph, June 7, 2017).10 In fact, May was 
“prepared to rip up human rights laws to impose new restrictions on terrorism suspects” 
(Mason, The Guardian, June 7, 2017 see also Hall 2017; Dunn 2017; Stevens 2017; Zeffman 
and Ford 2017). Travis added: 
 
The clear threat that she [May] is willing to amend human rights laws “if they get in the 
way of doing these things” is a recognition that some of the revived restrictions have 
already been subject to successful legal challenges in the British courts. This 
commitment appears to contradict the Tory manifesto pledge not to repeal or amend the 
Human Rights Act until after Brexit, but she may be relying on the fact that any legal 
challenges may well take at least two years to play out. (The Guardian, June 7, 2017) 
 
According to Alam and Husband’s (2013, 245), “the 2010 report of the House of Lords/House 
of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights provide[d] a distressing account of the 
government’s attempts to circumvent international human rights principles and law”. Sharpe 
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and Boucher (2010, 198-199) underscore this by highlighting how terrorist groups and Western 
governments are paradoxically framed:  
 
Because “Islamo-fascism” rejects liberal democracy and human rights as absolutely 
binding moral frameworks, these people are capable of every atrocity, from the 
slaughter of innocents in terrorist attacks to videotaped beheadings, which combine 
contempt for the humanity of their victims with ritualised barbarism. By contrast, when 
we engage in cruel and degrading forms of interrogation in a global network of secret 
prisons, up to and including perverse tortures recorded digitally at Abu Ghraib prison 
in Iraq, or when we drop massively destructive bombs on weddings in the hope of taking 
out a single al-Queda operative, this is as a momentary and regrettable suspension of 
human rights in the interests of the greater good. 
 
In a similar vein, calls for internment and a desire to “rip up” human rights revealed a clear 
rejection of the same values that previous articles had sought to promote. Instead, British 
tolerance was a “tolerance … premised upon a much more powerful but foresworn intolerance 
towards an engaged analysis with the structural causes of ethnic conflict conveniently dismissed 
as tribal in origin” (Taylor 2010, 131).  
 
Summary and concluding thoughts 
 
In her account of terrorism and its causes, Richardson (2007, xxii) argues that “the causes of 
terrorism are not to be found in objective conditions of poverty or privation or in a ruthless 
quest for domination but rather in a lethal cocktail that combines a disaffected individual, an 
enabling community, and a legitimizing ideology”. The issue here is that the “cocktail” which 
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Richardson (2007) details is one based upon preordained conditions rather than the objective 
violence that contours these conditions (Žižek 2010). By way of meeting this critique, this 
article has drawn upon Žižek’s (2010) subjective and objective violence in relation to 
newspaper coverage of a violent terrorist attack. Implicit in Žižek’s (2010) analysis is that the 
representation of a normal/peaceful society is based upon other less noticed forms of violence. 
As a result, this analysis has served to examine how media coverage of the London Bridge 
attack could elicit deeper forms of violence. In doing so, it identified the following results. 
First, examples of subjective violence were noted within the press’ coverage. This 
centered on the violent nature of the attack and the ways in which newspaper reports served to 
focus on its dramatic aspects. In particular, it was the apparent disruption of a “normal”, 
peaceful, free and liberal UK which was brought to light in newspaper coverage of the terrorist 
attack. Notably, such examples of subjective violence were grounded in the externalization of 
a clearly identifiable “other”. Here, examples of symbolic violence served to frame the terrorists 
and the attack as representationally tied to the UK’s Muslim community.  
Second, while framings of “the other” were predicated upon “a mysterious and partially 
defined them” (Howie 2012, 83 [italics in original]), this definition rested on examples of 
symbolic violence that followed a process of segmentation (Black 2016). This was evident in 
the press’ distinguishing between “good” and “bad” Muslims and in the ambivalent framing of 
the Muslim community, who were subsequently required to prove their allegiance to the UK 
and British values. As a result, Muslim groups were systematically caught between the prospect 
of being both included within as well as excluded from “the nation”. Like a Möbius strip, this 
inclusion/exclusion tension was symbolically reflected in forms of systemic violence, most 
notable in references to, and statements from, UK politicians and in newspaper representations 
of British values. As privileged actors of the UK state, the views and concerns of UK politicians 
highlighted the ways in which systemic violence could be symbolically performed. 
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Accordingly, if we consider subjective gestures to be linked with forms of objective 
violence (symbolic and systemic), then it is important that acts of terrorism are not considered 
as the actions of individual “men”, considered to be “mad” or inherently “barbaric”, but as a 
quite literal evocation of ignored violence within society. That is, as examples of symbolic 
violence reflected the ways in which newspaper discourses could select and position certain 
individuals/groups as outside “the nation” – a contention which rested upon a level of 
ambivalence – examples of systemic violence were most notable in the ideological edifice that 
underpinned the representation of British values. In such instances, newspaper coverage 
worked to uphold the illusion that “peace” could be achieved by eradicating terrorism through 
forms of systemic violence, including: internment without trial; the “ripping up” of human 
rights; and, closer surveillance of Muslim communities. To this end, newspaper reports of the 
attack ideologically functioned by directing attention away from the contradictions within 
society, towards narratives that sought to “fix” these contradictions through eradicating the 
problem of “the other” and/or violently protecting the British values “they” seek to undermine.  
In view of these contradictions, what we see in newspaper coverage is how the agents 
of subjective violence – “the terrorist(s)” – undergo a process of disenfranchisement that 
symbolically elevates them beyond comprehension. That is, while Žižek (2002) has commented 
upon “the metaphoric universalisation of the signifier ‘terror’”; a signification that could be tied 
to almost any message and “thus elevated to become the hidden point of equivalence between 
all social evils”, Richardson (2007, 10) contends that: 
 
a terrorist is neither a freedom fighter nor a guerrilla. A terrorist is a terrorist, no matter 
whether or not you like the goal s/he is trying to achieve, no matter whether or not you 
like the government s/he is trying to change.  
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What is significant from Richardson’s (2007) assertion is that, when considered through a 
Žižekian lens, the notion of a “terrorist” transcends any perspective (“no matter whether or 
not”). In so doing, “the terrorist” occupies both perspectives, becoming “the hidden point of 
equivalence” (Žižek 2002) for the “contradictions within Western social reality [which] appear 
as an external threat arising from without” (Sharpe and Boucher 2010, 35 [italics in original]). 
In fact, as that which occupies the antagonism between two opposing perspectives, the 
terrorists’ “equivalence” reflects what Žižek (2006) has referred to as a “parallax view”. 
According to Žižek (2006, 8), “the political parallax, [is] the social antagonism which allows 
for no common ground between the conflicting agents”. This parallax was violently brought to 
bear in both the terrorists’ subjective violence, and its subsequent reporting, but also, in the 
objective violence of the press, as seen in articles which prompted calls for internment without 
trial, violence against Islam and a rejection of human rights. In particular, this “gap” was 
reflected in the failure to offer any considered appraisal of the attack and/or a wider 
contextualization of terrorism. Instead, as the adversary of “our freedoms”, Islamic terrorism 
stood as the opposite of liberal democracy, a separation that was enacted and maintained 
through calls for further violence and discursively promoted through the perpetuation of British 
values that were predicated on the pejorative framing of the Muslim community. 
Indeed, by “learn[ing] to step back, to disentangle ourselves from the fascinating lure 
of this directly visible ‘subjective’ violence, … performed by a clearly identifiable agent” 
(Žižek 2010, 1) and through examining how both “Objective and subjective violence operate 
together to form the façade of the smooth running system and its underpinning beliefs” (Rudge 
et al. 2012, 34), this article reveals the extent to which newspaper coverage of the London 
Bridge attack helped to maintain the fantasy of British values as grounded in examples of 
acknowledged (subjective) and unacknowledged (objective) violence. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 The May attack took place in Manchester at the “Manchester Arena”. A home-made bomb 
was detonated as people were leaving a concert. 
2 Borough Market is located in Southwark, London. One of the largest markets in London, it 
trades in specialty foods. The London Bridge attack bared a similarity to a previous attack in 
March 2017, where, a 52-year-old Briton, Khalid Masood, drove along Westminster bridge, 
hitting pedestrians, before fatally stabbing a police officer outside the Palace of Westminster. 
3 Certainly, by focusing on the press’ coverage of one particular attack, the aim is not to 
dislocate this attack from previous attacks nor to ignore the long-term processes and power 
relations that frame understandings of “terrorism” (Dunning 2017). Instead, it is to examine 
how the ideological significance of terrorism was presented in newspaper coverage of a 
terrorist attack. 
4 See Dunning (2017) for a considered analysis of the structural (or, relational) features 
underlying the concept of the terrorist. 
5 Valentic (2008, 3) adds that in the case of “systemic violence, it should be emphasized that 
every state is in a way founded on violence, as many authors have pointed out so far”. 
6 The paradox here is noted by McDuff (2017), who highlights how “The west’s vocal 
commitment to its supposedly foundational virtues of liberalism and freedom stand in direct 
contrast to its determination to sell weapons to repressive theocratic monarchies if it serves its 
material interests”. 
7 Michael Gove is Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. 
8 Sajid Javid is Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. 
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9 This same section of May’s speech was also cited in Dunn (2017), Elliot (2017), Hague 
(2017), Travis (2017), Wright et al. (2017). 
10 The London Bridge attack took place during the 2017 general election campaign. 
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